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Partying Critics: A Dual Take on
Duality in Graham Greene’s “The
End of the Party”
Nathalie Jaëck and Arnaud Schmitt
1 This issue of Angles dealing with different practices of criticism seemed to us a very
welcome opportunity  to  do something we rarely  do:  look back on our  practices  as
critics,  assess  the  specific  nature,  the  role  and  the  relevance  of  our  critical  tools,
measure  our  ability  to  make  these  tools  evolve  and  to  bring  in  new references  or
methods, and perhaps above all try to explain how the selection of specific tools reveals
and clarifies our respective conceptions of our fields of expertise. Indeed, reflecting on
critical practices and choices is a way to delineate what our analysis of our object and
of  its  epistemological  value  is—and  this  is  currently  a  crucial  question  as  far  as
literature  is  concerned.  At  a  time  when  the  role  and  the  “use”  of  literature  are
everywhere under discussion or even under scrutiny, when the dominant utilitarian
paradigm often leads to questioning the pertinence of funding research in literature in
universities, we thought it might be interesting to address the issue via a reflexive and
double analysis  of  two habits  of  critical  practices,  their  impact on the reading of  a
selected text,  and what  they involve in  terms of  our  respective  academic practices
around literature.
2 It is probably necessary here to say a few words of our individual backgrounds. Our
desire to try that critical experiment was based on the assumption that we were similar
enough for informed mutual understanding in the field, and different enough in our
respective methodological choices for this experiment to be stimulating and enriching.
We are both trained in English studies, we both belong to the French 11th section of the
CNU  (Centre  National  des  Universités)  that  is  accountable  for  delineating  and
controlling scientific fields in France. We both chose literature as our major subject; we
both studied in French Universities (mainly Toulouse 2 Le Mirail for Arnaud Schmitt,
mainly  Bordeaux Montaigne  for  Nathalie  Jaëck).  We also  belong to  the  exact  same
generation—we were both born in 1969—, receiving the same academic training based
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on a post 1960’s conception of literature. Finally, we are both University Professors in
literature, in France. As for relevant differences, Nathalie Jaëck is a specialist in 19th-
century British literature,  with a specific  interest in the mutation of the adventure
novel at the turn of the century (she wrote her PhD on the Sherlock Holmes stories);
Arnaud Schmitt is a specialist of 20th-century American fiction, with a specific interest
in autofiction, cognition and Pragmatism. Though we both value narrative studies, we
favour  that  angle  from  rather  different  perspectives:  Nathalie  Jaëck  remains  very
indebted to French classical  narratology,  and Gérard Genette’s  categories  that  have
informed her early grasp on literature remain essential tools in the elaboration of her
critical  discourse on literature.  As for Arnaud Schmitt,  he studied the categories of
narratology from wider,  more numerous perspectives,  and has  been engaged in  an
enduring  theoretical  discussion  with  the  concepts  used  by  leading  contemporary
narratologists, particularly as regards cognitive and pragmatic narration. As to great
general  lines,  Nathalie  Jaëck’s  critical  culture  owes  much  to  French  theory:  she  is
specifically a close reader of Roland Barthes and Gilles Deleuze, and favours a structural
approach to literary texts, while defending the idea that literature is a hermeneutical
tool to approach central human issues linked to the construction of identity through
language.
3 We  decided  to  operate  in  three  steps:  to  select  a  common  text,  to  each  write  an
independent analysis of it, and then to produce a joint commentary on both our texts,
and  more  specifically  on  what  the  whole  process  reveals  about  our  respective
discourses on literature. When we started on the project, our hope was that such an
enterprise, one which was completely unusual for both of us, accustomed as we are to
working in our own zone of critical comfort, would be a way to help illuminate what
the  contemporary  stakes  are,  and  perhaps  the  points  of  debate,  when  studying
literature.  We hoped it  would  be  a  way  to  question,  put  into  perspective  and also
energize our respective methods.
4 We elected to work on “The End of the Party” published by Graham Greene in 1929, for
two major reasons. Firstly, it is a text that belongs to neither of our usual corpora, it is
a modernist short story, in-between our two respective periods and our two favoured
systems  of  representation  (Victorian  Realism  and  post-modern  contemporary
American fiction); in fact, none of us had read it before embarking on this venture.
Secondly,  we  decided  upon a  short  story  rather  than  an  extract  from a  novel:  we
thought it would be better to comment upon a whole, self-sufficient work rather than
on a fragment, as this would leave no possible interpretative ambiguity owing to the
difficulties raised by an incomplete text; it might also give easier access to the readers
of this paper, who might want to try their hands and complement our analyses with
theirs. Thirdly, we decided, against our typical practices, not to read any other analysis
of  “The  End  of  the  Party”  before  embarking  on  ours:  we  thought  getting  direct
documentation beforehand would skew the exercise.
5 The first part of the paper thus juxtaposes our two respective analyses of “The End of
the Party.”
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“The End of the Party”: a modernist short story
reflected in its Victorian double (Nathalie Jaëck)
6 On the face of it, “The End of the Party,” written by Greene in 1929 and one of his most
famous shorter works, is the tragic modernist short story of a muted child, 9 year-old
Francis Morton. The dismissal of the voice of the child by indifferent trivializing adults,
his inability to access direct speech and voice his intimate fears lead to his dropping
dead from a heart-attack at the end of the story after an ominous day of agonizing and
increasing panic, despite the efforts of his twin-brother Peter to help him out of his
cooped-up self.  Fiction  comes  here  to  the  rescue:  summoning free  indirect  speech,
Greene  allows  the  voice  of  the  child  to  be  heard.  He  gives  full  scope  to  Francis’s
impressions,  to  his  idiosyncrasies  and  fantasized  alternative  planning  of  reality,  as
symbolic  denunciation  of,  and  compensation  for,  the  authoritative  framing  of  the
child’s voice, as fictional reparation.
7 Yet, “The End of the Party” is also a very ambiguous and unsettling story of twins,
taking  line  in  the  long  tradition  of  Gothic  stories  about  doubles:  the  open  charge
against adults’ deafness to children’s voices and the efforts of the text to make them
heard cover another classical,  more disquieting and uncanny subtext,  that explores
Peter’s ambivalence towards his younger twin-brother. It is difficult not to notice that
all  the steps Peter consciously takes to help his brother tragically contribute to his
eventual death, up to the final decisive touch. The story starts and ends with Peter, and
the more problematic twin is perhaps not the one we initially thought: by the end of
the story, Peter eventually stands the narrative ground alone, and he has got rid of the
weaker “other” as he regularly calls his brother—but as Gothic tradition has it, getting
rid of the double amounts to self-destruction, as in the process, Peter deprives himself
of  the  convenient  back  base  his  brother  embodied  for  him.  Dispossessed  of  the
possibility  to  retroject  in  his  brother  the  weaker  parts  of  himself  he  refuses  to
recognize as his own, he is  left  in schizophrenic dissociation,  in “obscure self-pity”
(189)—unable to make the difference between the inside and the outside, mistaking his
brother’s heartbeat with his own.
8 Story and discourse thus follow the same treatment in Greene’s short story: “The End
of the Party” is a story about duality, but also a dual text, or rather a text that proposes
a  fruitful  confrontation  of  dual  literary  codes:  a  modernist  experiment  with  voice
twinned with a rewriting of a classical Gothic motif—the Double displaced and reflected
in  the  cracked  textual  modernist  mirror.  The  interest  of  such  duplicity  is  that  it
illustrates the fact that voice and identity are intimately linked. Francis’s troubles in
language—his aphasia, his echolalia, the dissociated opposition between his intimate
voice and what he actually utters—are not only literary food for a dashing modernist
experiment with discourse. They hark back to other texts, and as opposed to Francis
and  Peter  whose  duality  proves  destructive,  “The  End  of  the  Party”  embraces  the
creative possibilities of textual duality: it incorporates antagonistic literary codes in a
gesture of literary coexistence and tries to access the evading voice of childhood not as
picturesque anti-climax but as an excessive, unrecognizable other voice that leads to a
reinterpretation of self and otherness.
9 The short story first reads as an attempt at textual amends and compensation: Greene
denounces the minoring of  the voice of  children,  inherited from classical  humanist
tradition that has marked the child as an incomplete and therefore lacking sub-adult,
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whose incoherent babble and burble need to be disciplined into coherent logos, a minor
muted being by definition infans—infantis  in Latin precisely indicate the inability to
speak, a speaking child thus being an etymological oxymoron. This tradition is referred
to in the story by the opposition between Francis’s “unreasoning fear” (185) and the
regular return of “that adult refrain, ‘There is nothing to fear in the dark’” (186) or “‘
You know there is nothing to be afraid of in the dark’” (184). Reason vs. impressions:
armed with knowledge, strengthened by the dialectic force of logic, adults use logos as
an imperative instrument of  power to dismiss from above children’s “unreasoning”
fears as “childish,” the dismissive suffix invalidating their voices. Francis, dealt with in
the imperative mode, told about, told off, has thus no alternative but self-repression,
“blocking his mouth” (181) as soon as he wakes up, as he expects to be muted by the
imperative “cold confidence of a grown-up’s retort. ‘Don’t be silly. You must go. […]
Don’t be silly’” (184). The whole short story thus reads as a sort of sub-version that aims
at re-empowering children through exclusive free indirect speech: it is solely the voice
of  children  that  is  heard  in  these  long  sections,  and  adults  are  relegated  to  a
background where direct sentences become stale automatic common phrases that are
totally inefficient to grasp the complexity of reality. Greene thus writes a tribute to
what Henry James called “the picturing, personifying, dramatizing faculty of infancy,
the view of life from the level of the nursery-fender:”1 he levels the viewpoint indeed,
replacing  authoritative  certainties  with  tentative  impressions,  the  overhanging
controlling  standpoint  of  adults  with  the  fragmented  horizontal  shifting  stance  of
children,  and  the  unquestionable  mimetic  indicative  mode  with  experiments  on
potential and fictive present.
10 The central stakes of the modernist agenda are pretty clear from the second sentence,
“Through a window he could see a bare bough dropping across a frame of silver” (181):
a  limited  fragmented  perspective,  literally  framed  by  the  window,  a  highlight  on
modalized  vision  and  individual  perceptions,  and  a  process  of  “fictionalization”
through language. Entrusted to children, reality becomes unfamiliar and mobile, and
language  no  longer  serves  to  duplicate  reality,  but  to  open  up  more  desirable
alternatives.
11 Peter and Francis take rank among those “literary impressionists” Julia Van Gusteren
defined: “The Literary Impressionists, like the Impressionists in painting focused on
perception.  They  attempted  to  formulate  reality  by  breaking  it  into  momentary
fragments,  selected  intuitively  and  subjectively.  They  relied  on  sensory
(ap)perceptions” (28). Indeed, their day starts with an immediate colonization of solid
and measurable  reality  (“It  was  January the  fifth” [181])  by  distorting impressions,
subjective memories, imagination, sensations, and uncontrollable dreams: “It amused
him to imagine that it was himself whom he watched” (181) or “To Peter Morton, the
whole  room  seemed  suddenly  to  darken,  and  he  had  the  impression  of  a  great  bird
swooping”  (181)  while  Francis  is  caught  by  the  perseverance  of  the  nightmare  (“I
dreamed that  I  was dead” [182])  and it  takes him a while  to  allow “the fragmentary
memories to fade” (182), though “a sick empty sensation” (182) does not leave him. The
Positivist conception of reality, the illusion that one can have a direct understanding of
objective facts, as it is quoted in the direct assertive speech of the nurse—“Wind will
blow  away  the  germs”  (183)—yield  under  the  joint  pressure  of  these  subjective
distorting stimuli. But the text illustrates the modernist conviction that they are all
cognitive  clues, that  these  obscure  fears,  memories  and  impressions  are  all  to  be
trusted, much more than the hackneyed certainties of the parents: the mother’s smug
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logic leaves her wide off the mark, as she wrongly deduces that Francis’s making light
of his cold is due to his desire to go to the party. Trusted to Francis and Peter, reality
thus  becomes  mobile,  girls  are  animalized  as  “cats  on  padded  claws”  (182),  their
animated pigtails fantasized as so many aggressive devices, carpets are on the move,
darkness  becomes  populated  with  squatting  bats;  Alice-like,  Francis  distorts
proportions  and  sizes,  and  fantasizes  himself  very  small  to  Mrs  Henne-Falcon’s
“enormous bulk” (185). Defamiliarisation here celebrates the innocence of children in a
rather conventional, deludingly reassuring way as it creates comic relief in a growingly
ominous and oppressive story—as when Francis  reveals  he has  a  different  order of
priorities, and hopes he might “cut himself or break his leg or really catch a bad cold”
(183) rather than go to the party, or when he elaborates many “plans” to escape reality:
“They flew too quickly to plan any evasion” (184), “a dozen contradictory plans” (185),
“a few extra minutes to form a plan” (186). But these endearing touches are anecdotal:
children crucially  deterritorialize  reality  and replace the reliable  uniqueness  of  the
fixed indicative mode with endless possibilities of mutations. The potential mode and
fictive  present  replace  the  authoritative  indicative,  and  both  children fantasize  a
potential reality of what might happen. “Would” and “might” become the rule, by far
the dominant temporal markers in the story, and reality opens up as a totally blank
space: “Anything might happen” (183). This creation of a potential soothing double for a
reality that is cruel and thus inassimilable is analyzed by Clément Rosset in terms of
what  he  calls  “an  oracular  illusion”2 (21):  “Reality  is  admitted  only  under  specific
conditions and only up to a point: if it exaggerates or proves unpleasant, tolerance is
suspended”3 (8). Indeed, Francis’s planning voice amounts to an oracle: possibility turns
into certainty, “might” becomes “would” as the confident appeal to God reinforces the
oracular nature of the child’s voice:  “God would manage somehow” (183).  Facts are
dissolved by fantasy: reality can be hallucinated as other, ad libitum.
12 The  treatment  of  time  by  Peter  and  Francis  reinforces  the  sense  of  relativity:
chronological  collective  time,  just  like  solid  reality,  is  deconstructed  by  random
individual perceptions—the very repetition of the date,  three times in the first  two
pages, turns an objective neutral landmark into a double obsession, much desired by
Peter,  much dreaded by Francis.  The story builds a variety of  temporal  distortions,
particularly  of  the  narrative  category  of  duration:  objective  diachronic  time  is
deconstructed by effects  of  synchronic  short-cuts  as  the two children superpose in
their minds the day of the narration and the same day the year before. Peter “could
hardly  believe  that  a  year  had  passed  since  Mrs.  Henne-Falcon  had  given  her  last
children’s party” (181), while the two parties, last year’s and next night’s, overlap in
Francis’s  mind,  leaving absolutely  no  autonomy to  the  present.  The  repressed past
returns  as  prediction  of  the  future  and  contaminates  the  present:  “Time regresses
backwards and runs forwards. It mixes up times and tenses, it goes through them in all
directions, it unshackles itself”4 (Pontalis 13). Similarly time becomes flexible, either
extensive when it seems to Francis that the evening is extremely far away (“There was
all the morning before him and all the afternoon until four o’clock” [183]) or intensive
when the party draws near. The sense of emergency and inescapability is here rendered
by the repetitions (“the minutes flew. They flew too quickly” [184]) and above all by the
two successive ellipses that engulf part of the precious interval, and time catches up
with out-timed and unprepared Francis: “all unready, he found himself standing on the
doorstep” (184)—and then, cutting through the journey between the two houses, he
finds  himself  instantly  transported  to  the  other  hall,  without  textual  notice.  The
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predictable, measurable continuity and causality of diachronic time are here replaced
by  intensive  discontinuous  fragments,  and  children  experience  what  Jean-François
Lyotard called their essential “passibilité,” that could translate as “liability”: they are
both necessarily passive and fundamentally “all unready” to what is going to occur,
they experience a reality that exceeds and overspills their possibility of understanding
it—a reality that is perceived on the mode of permanent irruptive imminence.
13 As  Greene  gives  children  a  voice  back,  reparation  is  thus  not  his  only  intention:
children  also  embody  an  essential  relation  of  primary  heteronomy:  “liable”  to  the
event, they are invariably exceeded by a sense of estrangement both from the world
and from language,  and as  such,  they appeal  to  the writer  as  formal  models:  their
dissident infant tongue challenges the normative mother tongue, they invent what Gilles
Deleuze called “a minor use of the major tongue [that] traces within language a sort of
foreign tongue, which is not another tongue, but ‘a becoming-else’ of that tongue, a
minor use of that major tongue”5 (Critique 15). Writing thus becomes the paradoxical
anamnesis of childhood, the effort to rediscover that liminal state of estrangement, as
Lyotard suggested: “No one can write. Everyone, the ‘older’ one mainly, writes in order
to catch through and in the text something that he cannot write. Something that will
not be written, as he knows it. Let us call that thing ‘infantia,’ what does not speak, what
cannot be spoken. A childhood that is not an age in life, but haunts the discourse of
adults and escapes its control”6 (6).
14 Still, as far as reparation is concerned, the text does not go all the way: the voice of
children is limited to free indirect speech, apart from a few automatic answers and a
few tentative aborted questions that the adults remain absolutely deaf to. In “The End
of the Party,” Greene marks the typical embedding of the voice of children within an
overhanging third-person narration that frames and disciplines the words of the child.
Free indirect speech is thus also a stylistic boundary, a way to insist that words cannot
be spoken out, that children are not allowed free direct speech. The only solution for
Francis  is  to  fantasize  what  he  might  have  said  if  he  could  speak,  while  remaining
morbidly aphasic and obedient. The imperative mode used by the mother cannot be
answered, save potentially: “He would answer: ‘You can say I am ill. I won’t go. I am
afraid of the dark.’ […] He could almost hear himself saying those final words” (184).
There is thus a pathological dissociation between what we could call his inner voice,
what he imagines he could say, and the actual words that automatically come out of his
mouth, the way speech is prescribed by the adults’ codes. Francis is thus self-muffled,
caught  in  a  schizophrenic  derailment  of  symbolisation:  “oneself  as  someone  else”
indeed. His direct speech opposes his inner voice,  or what he allows himself to say
when he is alone with his brother. Whereas if he could, “he would answer: ‘You can say
I am ill. I won’t go. I am afraid of the dark’” (184), what he voices is the exact contrary,
as he conforms to the image of the obedient child: “I’ll  get up” (183), “I’m coming”
(184), “Good evening, Mrs Henne-Falcon. It was very good of you to ask me to your
party” (185). Whenever he tries to address the issue of his fear, once more his language
fails  him,  as  he  is  only  able  to  mimic  the  form  of  adults,  to  opt  for  a  distanced
impersonal analysis, and he becomes an instance of what Deleuze and Guattari called
“the  dried-up  child  […]  who  acts  as  a  child  the  better  when  no  flux  of  childhood
emanates from him”7 (Plateaux 42): “I think it will be no use my playing” and “I think I
had better not play” (186). Francis’s words are not his own, they are at odds with the
freer “jump-jump” (39) he pronounces in his head, they are the echo of the words of a
specular ideal double that he fantasizes and imitates. As opposed to the other children,
Partying Critics: A Dual Take on Duality in Graham Greene’s “The End of the P...
Angles, 3 | 2016
6
whose speech is characterized by grammatical mistakes and easy oral forms, “Oh, do
let’s”  (186),  and  “don’t  let’s”  (185),  Francis  is  caught  in  morbid  echolalia,  in  the
oppressive  structures  of  grammatically  correct  discourse:  he  frames  his  experience
through these controlling structures, which owes him the automatic approval of adults
—“Sweet child” (185)—but the rejection of other children: “in the precise tone that
other children hated, thinking it a symbol of conceit” (186). These troubles in language,
either the failure or the alterations of speech, are of course presented as the result of
the typical adult muting of the voice of the child. But “The End of the Party” also opens
another line of analysis and turns into a case of identity, as it insists that these troubles
in  symbolisation  might  also  well  be  symptoms  of  a  more  serious  case  of  self-
dissociation provoked by the dysfunction of the twins.
15 Peter and Francis present the reader with a classic case of contrasted twins: as René
Zazzo developed in his liminal study Les Jumeaux, le couple et la personne, twins are not so
much two of a pair as the complementary elements of a couple, with a rigid distribution
of roles. As the elder twin, Peter is also the dominant twin: active Peter vs. passive
Francis, bold Peter vs. fearful Francis, talkative Peter vs. aphasic Francis, “self-relying”
Peter (181) vs. dependent Francis. Peter is in charge, and thus plays the role of the
major helper to his brother, moved by “an instinct of protection” (181): he speaks for
and about his brother (“Francis has got a cold. […] Hadn’t he better stay in bed” [183]),
and constitutes his brother’s only prop-up, as when he delays the dreaded moment of
hide-and-seek in the dark by eating another piece of cake and sipping his tea slowly.
Peter and Francis thus seem to stand together against adversity: “the brothers came
together to the hall” (186). Yet, this sentence reads against another rather different
textual network of contradictory clues. Indeed, there is reason to believe that Peter’s
desire  to  help  his  brother  is  fundamentally  ambivalent  and  obviously
counterproductive: not only do all his attempts fail as he himself notices (“It was his
third failure” [186]), but every step he takes towards the supposed relief of his brother
is a step nearer his loss. From the beginning of the story, hints of such ambivalence are
numerous: Peter seems to prey upon his brother from even before he wakes, “with his
eyes on his brother” (181). He corners him with the humiliation of publicly revealing
his fright thus actualising one of Francis’s worst fears, and his move to join Francis
behind the bookcase decidedly  reads like  an animal  hunting a  crouching prey:  “he
moved silently and unerringly towards his object” (188), “he led his fingers across his
brother’s face” (188), “feeling down the squatting figure until he captured a clenched
hand”  (188),  until  the  oxymoronic  form,  “to  bombard  with  safety”  that  inscribes
unconscious ambivalence in the forms of language: “he bombarded the drooping form
with thoughts of safety” (189). For Peter “his brother” quite revealingly twice embeds
and unveils a more estranged and antagonistic form, “the br/other”: “the other who was
afraid of so many things” (181) and “grasping the other tightly” (188).
16 At that point, the modernist text becomes the echo of a canonical infratextual double,
and the story of Peter and Francis takes rank among famous Victorian pairs—Dr Jekyll
and  Mr  Hyde,  Dorian  Gray  and  his  portrait,  but  also  Maupassant’s  Horla,  or
Dostoyevski’s Double. Killing the other becomes a way to get rid of one’s weaker, abject8
or inassimilable part—just as Dorian Gray destroys his unbearable flawed version. Peter
seems to reproduce and heighten the same moves Francis dreaded so much—just like
the  girls  “on  padded  claws,”  he  “ben[ds]  and  unt[ies]  his  laces”  (188)  to  approach
Francis in his stockings, as silently as possible, and while Francis “had screamed when
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Mabel Warren had put her hand suddenly upon his arm” (182), it is “at the touch of his
brother’s hand” (189) “across his face” (188) that he drops dead.
17 But it is, of course, no efficient murder, since as in all these canonical cases of duality,
Peter mixes inside and outside, self and other—which is naturally favoured by the fact
that the two brothers are mirror-images of one another as both acknowledge, though it
is  worth  noting  that  Francis’s  analysis  of  duality  is  much more  elaborate  than his
brother’s. While Peter simply fancies they are the same, without any mediation—“It
amused him to imagine it was himself whom he watched, the same hair, the same eyes,
the  same  lips  and  line  of  cheek”  (181)—Francis’s  perception  makes  room  for
ambivalence and personal dissociation, as he metaphorizes the mediating role of the
mirror and the importance of the specular double, of the fantasized image: “To address
Peter was to speak to his own image in a mirror, an image a little altered by a flaw in
the glass, so as to throw back less a likeness of what he was than of what he wished to
be, what he would be without his unreasoning fear” (185). Francis acknowledges the
process of projection, the difference between the self and the ideal self, and his brother
embodies for him the role of ideal double.  The relationship is  not so much dual as
treble: there is Francis, Peter and the pulsional mediating image, where ambivalence
and rivalry  can  be  mediated  without  directly  involving  the  persons.  He  makes  the
difference not only between the self and the other, but above all between the self and
the image of the self, and the typical prop of the mirror helps him mediate his relation to
his own self—his twin is a way to confront his own fears, to recognize them as his own,
and thus to address duality and ambivalence as intimate part of the psyche. In his own
development,  his  brother  plays  the  structural  role  Jacques  Lacan  isolated  for  the
mirror: Peter symbolizes the successful relation between the Imaginary and The Real,
and he is well identified by his brother as such.
18 We should point out that Francis’s  perception of  the world is  in fact structured by
duality—and in this respect as well, “The End of the Party” can read as a mirroring
tribute to Victorian literature.  Indeed,  it  is  not  only his  brother that  is  a  desirable
other:  girls  and  women  also  contribute  to  the  delineation  of  his  self  through
stereotypical ambivalent dialectics of opposition and desire. Francis is a typical little
boy, characteristically disgusted by girls, by their superiority, confidence, even their
hair—as in  any proper  Victorian novel,  it  is  automatically  the  hair  of  females  that
strikes  fear  and  desire  in  males:  “Their  long  pigtails  swung  surreptitiously  to  a
masculine  stride”  (182),  “She  came  striding  towards  them,  pigtails  flapping”  (183).
Joyce and Mabel are two avatars of Medusa, petrifying Francis by their outward self-
confident sexual attraction,  by their combination of softness and violence (“padded
claws”  [182]),  by  their  usurpation  of  masculine  power—“their  sex  humiliated  him”
(182).  But  Joyce  and  Mabel  are  still  imperfect  underdeveloped  females,  still  rather
harmless, while bosomy Mrs Henne-Falcon is much more dangerous. Her very name is a
parody  of  all  the  tag-names  of  Victorian  literature:  both  a  hen  and a  falcon,  both
harmless and protective and potentially lethal—a domestic bird and a bird of  prey.
Quite tellingly, Francis is torn between decorous politeness and overwhelming desire,
and he cannot help the fixation on her breasts, fantasized as enormous: “his strained
face lifted towards the curve of her breasts” (185) and “his eyes focused unwaveringly
on her exuberant breasts” (186). Mrs Henne-Falcon is thus reduced by Francis to the
two typical  roles of  women, a hen-like mother,  surrounded by “a flock of  chicken”
(185), and a dangerous (because seductive) female. She is, in Mélanie Klein’s categories,
both the “good breast,” nourishing and protecting, and the “bad breast,” potentially
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lethal as pulsional partial object: the breasts fuel Francis’s concomitant desire and fear.
What is certain is that women are anything but protective in the story, though they are
typically reduced to their caring role-functions, and the adults failing the child are all
women: a nurse, a mother, and a hostess, presumably life-giving, protective and caring,
and yet all equally incompetent to protect the child, rushing him to his death. In his
intentionally regressive  portrayal  of  that  bunch  of  dangerous  females,  Greene
reactivates the Victorian conception to mark it as a fantasy, but also to highlight the
fundamental  role  of  such  fantasies  in  the  construction  of  the  self  for  little  boys:
othering the opposed sex as a path to difference, desire—and danger.
19 As opposed to Francis’s fine confrontation with the process of duality to elaborate his
own identity, Peter’s treatment of duality is fairly basic, and meant as self-protection:
he has simply retrojected onto his twin what he refuses to confront in himself. He will
not  recognize  vulnerability  as  his  own  and  “ab-jected”  Francis  thus  becomes  a
convenient  outward projection where he can circumscribe and deny his  own fears.
Compulsive repetition of the same oracular formula—“Then he remembered that the
fear was not his own, but his brother’s” (186); “but it wasn’t his own fear” (187); “He
knew that it was his brother’s fear and not his own that he experienced” (188)—reads
like  self-persuasion:  it  is  meant  as  a  performative  speech-act,  but  reads  as  ironic
misapprehension. Indeed, “self-reliance” (181) and “self-sufficiency” (184) are marked
as illusions, and the distribution of roles as a schizophrenic temporary way out: when
Peter is alone in the dark, his fear starts proliferating, and as he hallucinates squatting
bats  on  hooded  wings,  the  reader  realizes  that  he  desperately  needs  Francis  to
unburden his fears on him. Killing the double thus does not solve any problem, and
Peter’s “flaw” (185), diagnosed by his younger brother, surfaces as soon as Francis dies:
psychotic syndromes take over, and Peter is no longer able to distinguish the inside and
the outside, as he can now feel in himself “the pulse of his dead brother’s fear” (189),
and grief is tellingly reinterpreted as “an obscure self-pity” (189). Fear is now here to
stay,  though he cannot  figure  out  its  intimate  origin.  The crisis  of  identity  is  thus
double,  and  the  projection  onto  his  brother  amounts  to  an  alienation  to  himself:
according to Paul Ricœur’s categories, the crisis of idem, i.e. the crisis of sameness, now
amounts to a crisis of ipse, i.e. the crisis of selfhood. As Peter cleaved part of himself,
and dramatized on the scene of the unconscious the difference between self and other,
the mortal  blow affects  him too:  “As it  is  refigured in narration,  the self  is  in fact
confronted with the possibility of its own annihilation”9 (Ricœur 189). It is as if the
stage of the mirror had completely failed, and Peter’s perception were fixed at a stage
when the separation of his own body from the reflection were not yet achieved: he
returns to a fragmented body with disorganized aperceptions and sensations, and his
inner, presumably autonomous, voice regresses to a mere quotation of an adult phrase,
as final sentence of the story.
20 “The End of the Party” thus presents the reader with a multiple surface of a text. It is a
brilliant  illustration  of  the  literary  standpoints  of  Modernism,  where  “Infancy”  is
turned into a concept that leads to the deterritorialization of dominant semiotics: it is
remarkable how French theory has made childhood, because of its inherent relation of
estrangement with language and the world, both a creative literary potential and an
ethical injunction—Deleuze with the “the becoming-child” (“le devenir-enfant”), and
the active concept of the “infant tongue,” Lyotard with the idea of the passibility of
children and the way childhood remains active throughout life as a reminder of our
indebtedness to otherness. It  is also a more classical case of dual identity, paying a
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tribute  to  a  long  literary  tradition  and  illustrating  its  relevance  to  contemporary
psychoanalysis.  Greene  explores  and  experiments  on  the  correlations  between
language and identity without claiming to find a literary solution (the liberation of
language  still  leads  to  one  child’s  death,  and  to  the  other  child’s  experimenting
psychotic syndromes) but highlighting their complex interconnectedness.  Literature
stands  here  to  be  a  relevant  way  to  address  major  human  issues  by  stressing  the
importance  of  language  in  human  self-definition:  language  troubles,  failures  in
symbolic representation, the relative unreliability of one’s voice all reinforce Greene’s
desire to address the ethical problem of the recognition of otherness as an intimate
injunction.
 
Weak Plot and Big Surprise in Graham Greene’s “The
End of the Party” (Arnaud Schmitt)
21 The historical index inherent in this short story is quite low. There are no references to
any particular historical context and only a few details allow the reader deprived of
paratextual  elements  to  anchor  precisely  this  text  to  any  particular  period:  for
instance, the dated use of the word “nurse” (here, a person employed or trained to take
care of young children) and the quaint reference to people giving a “children’s party,”
even though this does not lead to a specific time anchor. For two researchers working
on different literary periods, we could say that Graham Greene’s short story represents
a form of mimetic neutral ground.
22 A majority  of  short  stories  open in  medias  res,  with a  sparseness  of  contextualizing
details;  subsequently,  they  have  more  leverage  when  it  comes  to  strategies  of
defamiliarization, since disorientation is maybe more sustainable in a short text than in
a novel. Indeed, “reading is a kind of ‘skillful coping,’” because, as Wolfgang Iser noted,
“literary texts are full of unexpected twists and turns, and frustration of expectations”
which allow us “to bring into play our own faculty for establishing connections—for
filling the gaps left by the text itself” (Iser 1980 in Tompkins 55). Short stories, more
than novels, resort to our ability to fill the gaps as quickly and efficiently as possible.
Mimetic elements need to be assembled as early as the first page, whereas in a novel,
one can make do with a prolonged state of uncertainty. Doležel wrote that from “the
viewpoint of the reader, the fictional text can be characterized as a set of instructions
according to which the fictional world is to be recovered and reassembled” (489). A “set
of instructions”… It is quite fortunate that recent developments in literary theory have
seen the notion of play return to center stage. According to Biederman and Vessel, the
“brain is wired for pleasure” (Armstrong 51) or so it seems. Furthermore, “the brain’s
ability  to  go  back  and  forth  between  harmony  and  dissonance  is evidence  of  a
fundamental playfulness characteristic of high-level cortical functioning” (Armstrong
51). This short story perfectly illustrates this balance, as we will see. But it is important
to note that, apart from the loose historical context mentioned above, “The End of the
Party” does not display any particular anti-mimetic strategies. Two of the key realistic
bases  are  covered:  who (the  characters  are  onomastically  and  psychologically
identified) and what (Francis’s fear of the upcoming party). As for the where element,
quite minimalist here, it has always seemed to me the least important element of the
realistic apparatus, one that every text can reasonably do without.
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23 Since I believe that what represents the very core of the experience of reading, affects
and percepts (“Art does not think less than philosophy, but it thinks through affects
and percepts”),10 drive our hermeneutical acts, but are extremely hard to formalize and
do not represent scientific materials for a majority of researchers in the humanities,
and since I have limited interest in thematic criticism (unless it focuses on what Jean-
Marie Schaeffer called “mimetic modelization”),11 I keep falling back on a single, but
broad  and  complex,  interpretive  stance:  cognitive  narratology,  which  aims  at
reconciling a transcendental approach (reader-response theory) with an immanent one
(structuralism). However, more often than not, for lack of scientific data, my reader-
response approach is unfortunately limited to my own approach.
24 Thankfully, I think that a lot of readers would have a similar experience of “The End of
the  Party,”  and  this  experience  could  be  described  as  “teleological,”  which  in  my
opinion can best be analyzed through structuralist eyes. Greene’s text is destined to
accompany  the  reader  all  the  way  to  a  particular  event,  or  more  precisely  to  a
particular end.  It mostly concentrates its literary resources on building up narrative
momentum in order to create a sense of expectation, a form of tension—something which
I will come back to. With this short story, “plot is the internal logic of the discourse of
mortality”  (Brooks  22).  As  early  as  the  first  two  pages,  there  is  a  strong  sense  of
foreboding that definitely influenced my reading (I am of course referring to reading
#1, and I think it is a major shortcoming of plot analyses not to distinguish between this
reading  and  the  subsequent  ones,  conducted  mostly  by  academics  for  research
purposes). The first ten lines are devoted to the traditional stage of mimetic orientation
(Peter waking up and being the focalizer of a scene in which his brother, Peter, is soon
mentioned), but beyond line ten, the narrative shifts into gear: “But the thought soon
palled, and the mind went back to the fact which lent the day importance” (181). The
“fact” is  made explicit  a few lines below for the reader who understands that Mrs.
Henne-Falcon’s  children’s  party  is  an  annual  affair,  taking  place  that  very  5th of
January, the mimetic date of the narrative. From this moment on, the plotting engines
start running and they run on lexical fuel: “Peter heart’s began to beat fast […] with
uneasiness […] the whole room seemed suddenly to darken […] a great bird swooping
[…] ‘I dreamed that I was dead,’ Francis said” (181-182). These words and expressions
are arguably meant to convey at least a growing feeling of “uneasiness,” if not outright
fear.  Do  they  achieve  this  goal?  As  Roland  Barthes  pointed  out,  we  keep
misunderstanding the effects of language and we often believe that the word “suffering”
conveys suffering.12 He wrote elsewhere that “the message [of a text] is parametrically
linked to its performance.”13 As far as I am concerned, the term “uneasiness” does not
create actual uneasiness, but it does alert me, too overtly maybe—and this overtness
might betray a certain literary tradition—to the strategy of the performance Greene
wants me to experience. The lexical field used by Greene in this passage creates a meta-
experience: I am aware of fear as a narrative technique, but not as an affect since at this
point, my empathy with the characters is too limited for any form of identification to
take place. All narratives rely on “reading as an anticipatory and retrospective process
of building consistency and constructing patterns” (Armstrong 54). Similarly, Wallace
Martin underlined the fact that “we read events forward (the beginning will cause the
end) and meaning backward (the end, once known, causes us to identify its beginning)”
(127), or at least the beginning as we remember it (especially for a 800-page novel). This
echoes Husserl’s description of any moment as characterized both by retentional and 
protentional horizons (Armstrong 93). But when it comes to short stories, and especially
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to  short  stories  like  Greene’s,  “the reading motion” is  mostly  protentional  since the
retentional horizon is logically limited by the actual size of the text. According to Iser,
reading implies a “continual interplay between modified expectations and transformed
memories” (Act 111), but the interplay is of course indexed on the length of the book.
With  “The  End  of  the  Party,”  the  main  reading  strategy  revolves  around
“expectations,” moderately modified since the structure is mostly binary here, or more
precisely consecutively binary: will Francis manage to avoid going to the party or not?
Will he overcome his fear at the party or not? (Or as an alternative plot: will the party
end well this time or not?) I believe that plots reveal what can be called the “structural
soul” of a fiction, its narrative balance. Instinctively, I was immediately drawn to this
aspect of Greene’s short story and none of its other features were compelling enough to
redirect my analytic attention.
25 Peter Brooks noted that “we have, in a sense, become too sophisticated as readers of
plot quite to believe in its orderings” (314). This is not exactly true: it is not a matter of
believing in its  orderings—plot  is  not linked to verisimilitude but,  as  we have seen
above, to effects and to a drive to carry on with a narrative—it is more a question of
accepting its orderings, of letting them work on us. But Brooks was right to mention the
advantage that some readers have over the plots of their time: they see through them,
they know them all, they can anticipate every twist the author painstakingly crafted.
And this is true for every literary era,  there is always a need for a renewal of plot
patterns, even if it means recycling ancient patterns. What was Greene’s strategy to
throw off-balance the most jaded readers in 1929 and prevent critics from drawing an
obvious comparison with Edgar Allan Poe’s stories? Two words: dual focalization, which
was a very modernist thing to do and not a very surprising one for an ambitious writer
at that time. Thus, the narratological appeal of this story does not stem from its duality
in terms of plots, but in terms of psycho-narration (even though, as we will see, it is not
strictly dual).
26 Let us turn back to the first two pages: they are seen (in the broad literary sense: seen,
felt, thought) through Peter’s eyes until the end of the first dialogue and the line which
ends  with  Francis’s  answer  “Did  I?”  and  signals  a  brief  and  momentary  shift  in
focalization:  “Francis  accepted his  brother’s  knowledge without  question,  and for  a
little the two lay silent in bed facing each other, the same green eyes, […]. The fifth of
January,  Peter  thought  again”  (182).  This  passage  perfectly  illustrates  the  modus
operandi of  this  short  story:  a  constant  shift  between  Peter’s  Point  of  View  (PoV),
Francis’s PoV and a form of external focalization, at least in the first part. What I call
‘the first  part’  can be characterized by the anxiety of  the looming party (from the
beginning to the middle of page 185, where Francis is eventually forced to leave his
home with  his  nurse  to  go  to  Mrs.  Henne-Falcon’s).  Its  main stake  is:  will  Francis
manage to find an excuse not to attend the party? But the structure of the psycho-
narration aforementioned is  also  meant  to  introduce  the  stakes  of  what  I  call  ‘the
second part’:  will  Peter  manage to protect  Francis?  Indeed,  the narratological  logic
induced by the shifts in focalization creates a closeness/remoteness dialectics.  The fact
that the brothers are twins is mostly used as a strategy of focalization. They seem to
know each other so well and yet there is a fundamental distance around which the
short story revolves: Francis is isolated in his fear. In addition, one of the subplots of
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the first part obviously is: if Francis cannot find excuses to avoid attending the party,
will Peter be able to protect him? Below are some examples of 
their closeness: “It amused him to imagine that it was himself whom he watched, the same
hair, the same eyes, the same lips and line of cheek” (181); “Already experience had taught
him  how  far their  minds  reflected  each  other”  (182);  “Francis  accepted  his  brother’s
knowledge without question” (182);
their remoteness: “But he was the elder, by a matter of minutes…” (182); “And last year… he
turned his face away from Peter” (182); “But though he was grateful he did not turn his face
towards his brother. His cheeks still bore the badge of a shameful memory…” (182);
Peter’s sense of responsibility towards his brother (and Francis’s reliance on him): “[…] had
given him self-reliance and an instinct of protection towards the other …” (182); […] “Peter
said with decision, prepared to solve all difficulties with one plain sentence…” (183); “When
the nurse came in with hot water Francis lay tranquil leaving everything to Peter” (182);
and finally his brother’s helplessness (and the limits of Francis’s protection): “[…] the other
[Francis] who was afraid of so many things” (182); “Their sex humiliated him…” (182); “‘I’m
sorry,’  Peter  said,  and then worried at  the sight  of  a  face  creased again by misery and
foreboding…” (183).
27 Another sign of Peter’s inability to protect his brother (and this is a hint of things to
come) is how, as a last resort, Francis entrusts his fate to God.
28 Moving  from  one  mind  to  the  other  both  reflects  and  generates  the  dynamics  of
protection/helplessness,  embedded  in  the  closeness/remoteness  dialectics.  But  as
noted above, there is also a neutral PoV in this story. The notions of external and zero
focalizations  are  highly  problematic,  perhaps  more  than  any  other  narratological
concept.  I  will  not  go  into  the  specifics  of  their  various  definitions  (too  often,  the
history of  narratology has been characterized by a string of  minor alterations to a
notion that was satisfactorily defined in the first place; although of course, sometimes,
it is necessary to redefine a term). However, when it comes to focalization, it would be
ill-advised  to  overlook  Alan  Palmer’s  major  contribution  to  the  representation  of
thoughts in literature. This short story’s use of psycho-narration would be described by
Palmer as “contextual thought report,” a technique consisting in describing “an aspect
of a character’s mind […] combined with descriptions of action or context” (Palmer in
Herman  331).  Palmer  goes  on  to  write  that  “contextual  thought  report  plays  an
important role in the process of characterization” because “constructions of fictional
minds are inextricably bound up with presentations of action. Direct access to inner
speech and states of mind is only a small part of the process of building up the sense of
a mind in action” (Ibid). In the case of “The End of the Party,” the balance tilts heavily
towards thought report rather than towards action and yet the description of the latter
still plays an important role in the story. And of course, within this category of “neutral
phrases,” dialogues must be included. Is this neutral focalization? Let us consider a few
examples in the first part: “The tall starched woman laid the towels across the cans and
said  […]  and  she  closed  the  door  behind  her”  (182);  “‘I’m  coming,’  he  called  with
despair, leaving the lighted doorway of the house; […] He comforted himself with that,
as he advanced steadily across the hall  […]” (184-185).  They give the impression of
being perspective-free, or at least as seen from a distance. One knows, of course, that
there is no such thing as a perspective-free phrase. Every word in a text is at least
materialized through the  perspective  of  the  reader.  Furthermore,  as  underlined by
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functioning”  (Fictional  5).  Palmer  goes  even  further  to  suggest  that  arguably  any
information in fiction is seen through a character’s eyes. I agree with him, since even
“no-narration” passages contribute to the psychological effort of building characters in
our  mind.  It  might  not  be  direct  psycho-narration  but  simply  indirect  psycho-
narration, or to use Palmer’s terminology, a loose form of thought report: information
that ultimately can be attributed to a character, even though no perspective is made
explicit.  Marie-Laure Ryan wrote that “we see the characters,  but we also see with
them” (234) and it might be the case when we read “she closed the door behind her.”
To me,  this  is  seen by Francis,  we see with Francis.  Neutrality in fiction is  counter-
productive as a concept. Or it could mean something totally different from what we
usually understand by it, that is to say a passage implying a lack of perspective; so-
called  perspectival  neutrality  simply  is  low  intensity,  that  is  information your  mind
skims through without generating the same level of psychological involvement as, for
instance,  when  the  word  “fear”  is  mentioned.  I  could  not  agree  more  with  Peter
Rabinowitz  when  he  claims  that  “[a]lthough  many  critics  argue  that in  literature
everything is significant, we know from experience that when we read literature (as
opposed to the single sentences so many critics offer as examples), it is impossible to
keep track of, much less account for, all the details of a text” (19). As far as my reading
of this short story is concerned, “she closed the door” implies a low level of affective
and emotional intensity,  but it  is  certainly not neutral in terms of perspective,  nor
comparable to stage directions in a play for instance. My experience of the first scene is
then mostly defined by the aforementioned dual psycho-narration and the dialectics
whose sole purpose is to build up the tension that will climax in the second part.
29 A possible counter-argument is that the neutrality that I refuse to see is here to disrupt
the binary narratological model of the first part of the story. What would be the point
of disrupting this duality? Offering an adult perspective, for instance? I am not opposed
to this  interpretation,  but  the text  simply does not  work like this  for  me.  You see
through Peter and Francis, you see with Peter and Francis and you possibly see Peter and
Francis, but the latter case contributes to the psychological portrait of the two brothers
and their interaction. Even if you consider that the “neutral statements” are a weak
form of focalization, they still echo the distance/proximity dialectics characterizing the
two brothers’ relationship. Once again, we waver between two flows of information, but
this time between a quasi-neutral and a highly personalized one.
30 As soon as the reader understands that there is no way out for Francis and that he will
have to attend the party, the first part loses some of its interest and one of the main
narrative merits of “The End of the Party” is to move quickly and seamlessly to the
actual party (185), where the stakes become suddenly different but still dual and still
with a subplot: will Francis avoid playing the much dreaded hide-and-seek in the dark?
If  not,  will  he  overcome  his  fear?  Although  the  remoteness/closeness  dynamics
between the two brothers still holds, the constant flow between the minds of the two
brothers is no longer as systematic as in the first part, especially since at the end of this
part,  Peter  disappears,  leaving  Francis  to  fend  for  himself.  But  it  remains  highly
relevant because their bond and differences as twins are soon reintroduced: “As a twin
he was in many ways an only child. To address Peter was to speak to his own image in a
mirror, an image a little altered by a flaw in the glass, so as to throw back less a likeness
of  what he was than of  what he wished to be […]” (185).  And as seamlessly as  the
transition from part one to part two, Francis finds himself in the space of a few lines in
the situation that has racked him with fear since he woke up and that he has spent the
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whole day trying to steer away from. It is worth noting that the two events Greene’s
plotting  strategy  is  hinged on happen in  the  blink  of  an  eye,  without  the  reader’s
attention  being  overtly  alerted:  “Without  looking  at  this  brother,  Francis  said,  ‘Of
course I’ll play. I’m not afraid, I only thought…’ But he was already forgotten by his
human tormentors  and  was  able  in  loneliness  to  contemplate  the  approach  of  the
spiritual, the more unbounded torture” (187). As Francis’s sentence is interrupted and
cut short, so is the dilatory space, the sense of fate, part and parcel of what I call “doom
plots,” characterized by the likelihood that something bad might befall one of the main
characters  and energized not  by  actual  events  but  by virtual  ones,  i.e.  what  might
happen.
31 It is Francis’s turn to disappear in the second part, and Peter’s turn to be isolated, not
in  fear  but  in  his  inability  to  protect  his  brother.  As  soon as  the  game starts,  the
narrative  mostly  inhabits  Peter’s  psyche:  “Peter,  too,  stood  apart,  ashamed  of  the
clumsy manner in which he had tried to help his brother” (187). For a few paragraphs,
the reader literally follows Peter in the dark, unaware of Francis’s whereabouts and
reactions, even though Peter—and of course the reader since this darkness is what the
narrative has been homing in on since the beginning—tries,  if  nothing else,  to  put
himself in his brother’s shoes (“Now he could feel, creeping in at the corners of his
brain, all Francis’s resentment of his championing. […] Then darkness came down like
the wings of a bat and settled on the landing” [187]). It appears at first that there will
be no disruptions in the last section’s focalization strategy as Peter sets his mind on
finding his brother but the opposite happens; there seems to be a blending of voices
and feelings on page 187, which results in a form of telepathic communication between
brothers. We suddenly shift from Peter’s to Francis’s PoV: “Peter stood in the centre of
the dark deserted floor […] waiting for the idea of his brother’s whereabouts to enter
his brain. But Francis crouched with fingers on his ears […]” (my emphasis). The sudden
focalization  on  Francis  appears  external  but  soon we reenter  his  psyche,  with  one
notable difference as  it  is  done through Peter’s:  “The voice called ‘Coming,’  and as
though  his  brother’s  self-possession  had  been  shattered  by  the  sudden  cry,  Peter
Morton jumped with fear. But it was not his own fear. What in his brother was burning
panic […] was in him an altruistic emotion that left the reason unimpaired” (187). This
key passage re-enacts the remoteness/proximity dialectics, a combination of telepathic
proximity and fundamental distance (Peter is not afraid). The closing of this paragraph
ironically  bolsters  this  dynamics,  as  the  narrative  audience  is  told  that  certainly
“between the twins there could be no jargon of telepathy” and that “[t]hey had been
together in the womb, and they could not be parted,” while knowing that the plot relies
on the fact that they can never be together. The blending of voices and of PoVs is an
illusion,  as Francis’s  fear is  imagined by Peter,  who nevertheless can never feel  his
brother’s  fear.  Once  again,  Francis  disappears  as  Peter  resumes  his  search  for  his
“younger” brother but even when he eventually finds him, the narrative will  never
adopt  Francis’s  PoV  again,  thus  narratologically  foreboding  the  dramatic  ending.
Indeed, Francis only exists through Peter’s perception of him, which, as the last two
pages reveal, is fundamentally insubstantial. Take the following examples from page
188:  “Francis  did  not  cry  out,  but  the  leap  of  his  own  heart  revealed  to  Peter  a
proportion of Francis’s terror”; “[…] and he was aware of how Francis’s fear continued
in spite of his presence”; “He knew that it was his brother’s fear and not his own that
he experienced”; “He did not speak again, for between Francis and himself touch was
the  most  intimate  communion”;  “He  could  experience  the  whole  progress  of  his
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brother’s  emotion  […].”  When  set  against  the  dramatic  finale  and  the  external
realization that he involuntarily killed his brother (“But she was not the first to notice
Francis Morton’s stillness, where he had collapsed against the wall at the touch of his
brother’s hand” [188]), all these excerpts retroactively (i.e., during the second reading)
convey a grim irony which is the outcome of Greene’s PoV shifts or, in the second part,
illusionary shifts.
32 In terms of focalization, the story’s final paragraph is the only time we undoubtedly
inhabit a PoV that is neither Francis’s nor Peter’s. It appears at first to be Mrs. Henne-
Falcon’s as her scream indicates that she is the first one to realize what happened, but
it  is  not.  Actually,  the  first  part  of  the  last  paragraph  is  a  form  of  unnatural
narratology14 and of ironical focalization: as it happened in the dark, no one was in a
position to know that it was the “touch of his brother’s hand” that caused Francis’s
death. Especially not Peter, as we finally realize that, when it comes to his brother,
Peter knows nothing,  not even that his brother is  dead: “It  was not merely that his
brother was dead. His brain, too young to realize the full paradox, yet wondered with
an obscure self-pity why it was that the pulse of his brother’s fear went on and on,
when Francis was now where he had been always told there was no more terror and no
more darkness” (189). It goes “on and on” because all along, he has been feeling his
own pulse, nothing but his own pulse; there has never been any connection. The end of
the story is when the reader finally realizes the madness of pretending to know what
the other thinks, let alone feels.
33 But the former sentence is a philosophical flourish diverting attention away from what
I perceive as being the core of this story: the structural interaction between plot (what I
called  dual  plots)  and  focalization,  and  more  precisely  the  way  Graham  Greene
orchestrates  his  story’s  psycho narration in  order  to  give  the illusion of  proximity
while  maintaining  the  fundamental  distance  between  the  brothers,  a  pattern
characterized by the figures below (Fig. 1 and 2),  in which we see how we oscillate
between different focalizations in the two parts of the short story:
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Figure 1. Part one of the story oscillates between Peter’s and Francis’s Point of View (PoV)
There is a constant flow between the minds of the twin brothers, although at the end of this part Peter
disappears, leaving Francis to fend for himself.
 
Figure 2. Part two of the story is almost exclusively set from Peter’s PoV and ends with a ‘neutral’
focalization in the last sentence
The end of the story is when the reader finally realizes the madness of pretending to know what the
other thinks, let alone feels.
34 Like any plot, whether or not it creates genuine surprise at the end of its unfolding, the
real interest lies in how the author underpins its structure and what it reveals about his
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perception of  his  narrative audience.  The dialectical  energy used by Greene in this
story is particularly subtle. As for his use of focalization, it is in keeping with the most
sophisticated representations of consciousness found in the works of some of his most
famous contemporaries, such as Woolf or Joyce. It also explains why the end of the
story  may  appear  to  some  readers  as  being  disproportionate  with  regard  to  the
narrative structure upon which it is built. It almost seems unnatural for a character to
be  literally  scared  to  death.  And  the  narrative  stakes  (attending  a  party  or  not,
overcoming one’s fear or not) finally seem at odds with the story’s macabre outcome.
Indeed,  as  remarked  upon  several  times  in  this  article,  what  Umberto  Eco  called
“signals of suspense” (52) are quite dim and limited to one’s child excessive fear. In
terms  of  narrative  tension,  we  have  seen  that  Greene’s  devices  are  mostly
narratological  and  circumscribed  to  the  psychological  interaction  between  the  two
brothers. In La Tension narrative, Raphaël Baroni analyzes the three modes of exposition
outlined by Meir Sternberg: “surprise” is defined as the “temporary concealment of a
crucial  information,”15 “curiosity”  as  an “only  partial  erasure  in  the  discourse  of  a
crucial event”16 and finally “suspense” as “an initial event having the potential to lead
to  an  important  result  (good  or  bad)”17 (107,  108).  Similarly,  Baroni  distinguishes
between  “prognosis”  and  “diagnostic”  (110);  the  former  refers  to  a  low  form  of
anticipation based only on the premises of a narrative development whereas the latter
rests  on  actual  clues  allowing  the  reader  to  have  an  uncertain  understanding  of  a
narrative situation presented only partially. Greene’s peculiar take on plot is a mix of
“surprise” and “curiosity,” or more precisely a weak form of “curiosity” (since to most
readers,  myself  included,  Francis’s  fear  of  the  party  never  appears  as  potentially
hazardous for the health of the boy) seemingly only able to trigger off a tenuous level
of  reader  involvement  in  terms  of  “prognosis,”  and  unconnected  to  the  genuine
“surprise”  closing  it.  Admittedly,  the  story’s  main  “surprise”  stems  from the
disconnection between “curiosity” and “surprise.” In other words, we never go through
the “suspense” stage, or the more advanced hermeneutical form of “diagnostic” since
the  clues  to  the  possible  outcome  are  simply  not  there  and  we  never  realize  that
Francis’s fear is “an initial event having the potential to lead to an important result
(good or bad)”—at least not that bad.
35 As a conclusion, through this unexpected and hyperbolic outcome, Green seems to tell
his reader that while pretending to build a minor plot, he was building something else, a
major surprise. His strategy is a very modernist way of telling us that plot is not what
we think it is—or at least, his plot is not what we think it is—while making sure that we
keep in mind what it normally is, so that we realize that what he has been doing all
along is  not what we think he has been doing:  it  is  the narratological  pattern that
makes  this  play  with  the  narrative  audience  worthwhile.  I  am convinced  that  this
discrepancy between expectations and outcome is exactly what the author wanted us
to focus on.
 
A joint analysis, or joining our analyses
36 The present undertaking is not aimed at criticizing another critic’s take on a text, in
the  sense  of  indicating  the  faults  of  someone  else’s  analysis.  It  would  be  in  total
contradiction  with  the  very  nature  of  literary  analysis  which  is  but  one  area  of  a
broader  category,  literary  theory.  On  the  topic  of  a  so-called  critical  subjectivity,
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Umberto Eco’s  Interpretation and Overinterpretation serves as  our reference,  including
Eco’s  but  also  Culler’s,  Rorty’s  and  Brooke-Rose’s  perspectives  on  the  particularly
contentious topic of what constitutes a sensible interpretation. Eco, as broad-minded a
critic as could be, believed that certain analyses can be seen as “unlimited semiosis”
(23). In other words, textual interpretations that do not seem connected in any way to
the text they pretend to analyze. For Eco, there is a textual reality we cannot jettison:
“Between the mysterious history of a textual production and the uncontrollable drift of
its future readings, the text qua text still represents a comfortable presence, the point
to which we can stick” (88).  This “comfortable presence” we can “stick to” is  what
American  philosopher  Joseph  Margolis  called  the  “inviolable  constraints”  (82)  we
believe works of art possess. The fact that the two main characters in “The End of the
Party” are named Francis and Peter certainly is an “inviolable constraint”, and the fact
that Francis dies at the end is another, although less inviolable than the first, since we
are certain that one could convincingly argue that Francis cannot die since he does not
actually exist. Greene’s short story would then be interpreted as the account of a child’s
schizophrenic fixation on a non-existing twin. But Eco is certainly right to contend that
a text has a factual being and not everything can be said about it as, for instance, to take
an extreme example, that “The End of the Party” takes place in China in the Middle-
Ages  and  that  the  characters  are  Nà  and  Jing.  Eventually,  Eco  sensibly  challenges
“Valéry’s  statement  according  to  which  ‘il  n’y  a  pas  de  vrai  sens  d’un  texte,’”  but
accepts “the statement that a text can have many senses,” although he categorically
refuses “the statement that a text can have every sense” (Eco 141). Briefly, we think Eco
should  have  differentiated  between  what  you  say  about  a  text  (the  names  of  the
characters),  and  what  you  say  about  your  interpretation  of  a  text  (the  nature  of  the
relationship  between  the  two  brothers).  To  put  it  differently,  it  is  similar  to
distinguishing between reading and interpreting, but we are far from convinced that this
distinction always stands.18 When it comes to what is said about a text, “the critic who
‘recovers’ the meaning of any given work always does so by establishing a relationship
between the work and some systems of ideas outside it” (Scholes in Rabinowitz 19). To
conclude  this  brief  ideological  contextualization,  we  have  both  been  using,  in  our
respective  interpretations  of  Greene’s  story,  different  tools  coming  from  distinct
“systems of ideas” but, as we will see, we also agree on some unquestionable features.
Now comes the stimulating dialectical part in which we will delve into our differences
and similarities and try to account for them, while attempting to elaborate on what
they might reveal of our respective critical positions about the link between literature
and criticism. The result is somehow what we hoped it would be: we are presented with
two largely different outlooks on the same short story, which allows us quite a lot of
scope  and  material  for  comparison  and  analysis.  It  is  a  fact,  mentioned  in  our
introduction, that we belong to a similar generation and that we trained academically
in  Anglophone  literature  and  French  theory  (structuralism,  including  Genette’s
narratology, and philosophy, including Lacan). But it is also fair to say that, along the
way, we have developed different theoretical proclivities. Nowhere is this more visible
than in our “Works Cited” sections.  Nathalie  Jaëck’s  reflects  her strong intellectual
involvement  with  contemporary  French  theory,  and  Arnaud  Schmitt’s  mirrors  his
growing interest in a “scientific” approach to literary theory. In a way, to quote Scholes
again,  our systems of  ideas are doubly “outside”:  outside the work under study,  of
course, but also quite dependent on adjacent critical fields. Beyond our differences, our
analyses also emphasize a fact that many critics choose to overlook when they decide
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to make authoritative claims on the nature or the ultimate meaning of a particular
work: that once we have opted for a particular critical angle—and we are primed to do
so  by  our  cultural,  intellectual  influences—we tend not  to  pay  attention to  critical
alternatives  and  we  inevitably  hyperbolize  our  critical  claims,  be  it  simply  by
privileging them over alternatives. Such an enterprise crucially forces us to materially
acknowledge  and  confront  these  alternatives,  and  to  read  our  respective  analysis
against these new critical data; we will give examples of this below.
 
Common points
37 Let us first concentrate on what we have in common. In Graham Greene’s “The End of
the Party,”  we both see  a  considerable  amount  of  duality.  Actually,  we analogously
based our interpretations on the analysis of complex dual structures, whether formal,
thematic or intellectual. Jaëck’s reading of the story hinges on Greene’s elaboration on
the Gothic motif of the double that relies on the dual nature of dialogicity in the text,
and on the hybrid nature of the use of free indirect speech. She eventually addresses the
psychological  and  discursive  nature  of  the  relationship  between twin  children,  and
more generally of the dis/similar other. She links these different dualities to a more
wide-ranging dialectics,  one that lies at the very heart of her current research: the
minor/major dialectics. As for Schmitt, his dualities are more narratological as he turns
his attention to the interaction between dual focalization and double plots, and to the
dialectical impact it has on the unfolding of the narrative from a reader’s perspective.
He uses this perspective also to reflect on zero focalization, and perhaps to question the
fact that there is one in the text: he concludes that we mainly “see with” the children,
even when we do not see directly through them—which, of course, we both agree upon.
Jaëck reckons that dual focalization serves Greene’s purpose in this typical story of
twins, how the technical process of dual perspective and the dialectics of closeness/
remoteness  it  allows  constitute  a  very  adequate  stylistic  way  to  approach  Peter’s
ambivalence—to her it has got the role of a formal clue, leading her to interpret the
text, and in this case to highlight an underlying structure of,  indeed, closeness and
remoteness that is relevant to the case of Peter and Francis as twins. In other words,
Jaëck is also interested in what the text says about duality—but is it what Schmitt calls
“thematic  criticism”?19 Perhaps  this  is  an  interesting  element  of  further  discussion
worthy  of  another  article:  literature  as  interpretation  of  the  world,  or  rather  as
alternative  way  to  approach  knowledge.  In  all  cases,  we  both  acknowledge  the
importance of structure in itself because of what it does to the reader (mainly Schmitt)
and what it says about the self and the world, as relevant cognitive discourse (mainly
Jaëck).
38 We both saw an overriding pattern in this text, one that we might have been prepared
to  see  for  various  reasons,  but  also  one  that  is  certainly  embedded  in  the  textual
features of the text: the choice of twin brothers as main characters and the mostly dual
focalization, going back and forth between the brothers’ differently tormented minds.
This  aspect  of  the  story  might  not  be  an  “inviolable  constraint,”  but  from  our
(professional) perspective, it is difficult to miss it. Besides, once you strip the story of
this aspect, i.e. the dual focalization (as a narratological technique and a psychological
and discursive dimension), “The End of the Party” loses its main stake and a substantial
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part of its narrative interest. Of course, there is always the possibility of being mistaken
and we may be missing out on another major feature of the text.
39 Another common point of  interest  is  the treatment of  time:  we both note Greene’s
production of a sense of ominousness in the text, and link it to his treatment of time in
the story. We both deal with the formal manipulation of diegetic time, note the gaps in
narrative time, and interpret it basically in the same manner, though there would be an
interesting notion to discuss—Schmitt argued there is no real suspense, but Jaëck is not
so sure, a discrepancy due to a different take on focalisation zero. The major reason
why Jaëck sees suspense in the story is probably linked to the fact that what Schmitt
calls “the weak plot of the text,” which Jaëck agrees on and understands, immediately
collided, in her first reading, with the archetypal 19th-century Gothic plot of the stories
of Doubles. For her,  suspense is  thus indeed not created so much by Greene in the
actual, mimetic plot of the story, but in its playful incorporation of a literary pattern. It
is thus of a metatextual nature: Is Greene reworking the pattern of duality? Are the
twins going to follow the destiny of their fictive forebears? What kind of twist, what
kind of  “surprise”  (in  Schmitt’s  terms),  is  the  modernist  rewriting  going  to  allow?
Comparing the analyses of two specialists is also a way to delineate the places where
analyses diverge, or do not totally converge—it is a way to see which categories leave
room for interpretation. In this case, it seems to further Schmitt’s idea that focalisation
zero  is  indeed  a  concept  that  needs  ampler  development  in  general  narratological
criticism.
40 Jaëck was very interested in the notions of retentional and protentional horizons, and
also the notion of expectation as concepts, because to her they are effective, and allow
a further development of, or at least a more detailed approach in, her analysis. It seems
to her that the dynamics described by Schmitt can also be embedded and applied to
Peter himself: when she argued that Peter was stuck in-between past memories and
anticipation  of  the  future,  it  could  be  usefully  rephrased  as  stuck  between  the
retentional and the protentional horizons. Jaëck thinks she will use these categories,
because the notion of a horizon and the dynamic nature of the process it defines, seem
very adequate and operational to her. In “The End of the Party,” Francis is both blocked
back  by  the  retentional  horizon and utterly  panicked  by  the  protentional  horizon:
there is no stability, no autonomy of the present, dynamically torn and deprived of any
solidity or reality. It thus seems an adequate concept to address the issue of temporal
dilations:  it  definitely adds meaning to the more common notions of analepses and
prolepses by adding the dynamic notion of process; it is not just a self-contained jump
in or back in time, it is a way to name the active attraction of the two horizons. It
makes it  possible to reinterpret the conception of time in a dynamic rather than a
static manner, and the two children’s parties not as static points before or after, but as
active lines  that  draw Francis  both ways.  In Deleuzian terms,  they are not  lines  of
escape; on the contrary they are morbid lines of reterritorialisation of the present in an
overhanging, controlling and oppressive time structure. To Jaëck, these terms are thus
truly efficient, because their technicity permits to inscribe intention and meaning. It is
here interesting to note that widely different tools (cognitive narratology and psycho-
philosophy) enable the authors to draw relatively close textual interpretations of the
treatment of time.
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Differences
41 And now for differences. Though we both decided to privilege the duality inherent in
the psychonarration of the twins, and also focused on Greene’s treatment of time, our
paths parted: what we decided to make out of this duality, for instance, was surprisingly
different. At the very core of this difference lies one of the key questions every critic
should ask himself/herself regularly: what is it that we do with texts? To which one
must add a series of corollary questions: how does it enlighten the text? What purpose
does it serve? What does it reveal about us as readers? What does it reveal about the
community we belong to? The answers to these questions go a long way towards a
better  understanding  of  the  not-necessarily-natural  link between  fiction  and  the
discourses it generates. After reading our respective analyses of Greene’s story, anyone
can see that we do very different things with texts.
42 A good way to grapple with the fundamental differences in our readings of the same
text is perhaps to focus on what we didn’t see or pay attention to. Indeed, duality is just
a cornerstone on which many different stones can be assembled. For instance, Schmitt
obviously overlooked the importance of the “Gothic stone”—we assume here that one
of the purposes of interpretation is to recover some of the hypertextual influences of
the text,  to  insert  the text  where it  also belongs,  in a  textual  network it  explicitly
addresses and comments upon. This might be easily accounted for: even though Gothic
literature it is a major influence in America, it simply is not the area Schmitt works on.
Although he is aware of what American Gothic means in terms of literary and (more
generally) artistic history, his knowledge of this specific field is too limited for him to
make any noteworthy contribution on the topic. He nevertheless broached the matter
of influence, Poe being an obvious one (as well as Henry James, but he only realized this
after  writing  his  first  part).  His  interest  lay  more  in  the  question  of  the  readers’
narrative  expectations  in  1929  and  how Greene  could  have  positioned  himself  with
regard to them when he designed his macabre tale of twins.
43 Conversely, Jaëck’s stress and keener grasp on literary history (working on 19th-century
literature, she is more used to integrating such aspects into her critical modus operandi
than Schmitt who mostly works on authors who, more often than not, are influenced by
other contemporary authors,  the historical dimension playing a more limited part in
their  aesthetic  practices)  would be a  perfect  stepping stone (to  carry the “building
metaphor”  further)  to  a  better  understanding  of  Greene’s  technique  to  renew  the
genre,  or  at  least  to  provide  an  alternative  reading  and  rewriting  to  past  Gothic
narratives. Jaëck chose to focus on different facets of this short story’s historical frame:
according to her, the close and unexpected interplay between an earlier genre—the
Gothic—and a dynamic literary period spanning several decades turns this “dual text”
into an elaborate palimpsest, superposing Gothic motifs with modernist experiments.
Without  having  access  to  the  same  depth  of  historical  contextualization,  Schmitt
nevertheless points out that Greene’s peculiar plotting strategy stems from a modernist
representation of streams of consciousness. 
44 We both agree on this necessary stage of analysis: ascertaining how a text is shaped by
a literary or cultural tradition, and also how it contributes, in turn, to changing this
very same tradition; quite logically, this stage implies uncovering hypertextual traces.
Besides,  our  different  tools  also  lead  us  to  draw  the  same  conclusions  about  the
metatextual nature of the text: for both of us, it is a text that stages its own writing
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process. For Schmitt, it is visible in the overt nature of the narrative technique; for
Jaëck,  in  the  explicit  signalling  of  by-the-book modernism:  “impressions,”  “frame,”
“fragments”  are  all  there,  highlighting  the  fact  that  the  children’s  voices  are  also
experiments  in  Modernism as  a  way out  of  a  stifling  controlling voice—a dissident
offspring of authoritative Realism. Both “sets of tools” conduce us to be aware of the
central fact that the text is also a self-conscious artefact, and that texts stage their own
writing processes. However, we do not produce the same discourse with that textual
fact. Jaëck’s interest lies in this respect mainly in characterizing the movement the text
belongs  to,  the  literary  stance  of  the  author,  and  through  the  awareness  of
metatextuality she attempts to delineate the characteristics of the text that might link
it to a literary context, to a literary intention that she is interested in historicizing. For
Jaëck, the text takes rank in the modernist movement, and reading this text is a way to
improve one’s understanding of modernist intentions—notably in what literature then
originally proposed in terms of an exploration of the links between the configuration of
narration and the configuration of the self. Schmitt sees this historicizing process as a
necessary and fascinating stage, but he believes a text’s main semantic influence does
not spring from the period during which it was written but from the period(s) during
which it is read (of course, to return to Eco’s intentio operis, the former has inevitably an
influence  on  the  latter);  in  other  words,  how  contemporary  readings  activate  the
meanings of older texts.
45 One could argue that picking out duality as the narrative balance and essence of this
text and considering the contextualizing stage as a necessary one sum up the extent of
our “agreement” on “what to do” with this story. But it is also fair to say that both our
analyses  also  demonstrate  a  fair  share  of  close  reading  (mostly  of  the  structural
implementation of psychonarration) and a modest one of traditional thematic reading
(interpreting the psychology of characters as if they were real human beings). But, to
come to the main point of the self-reflective part of our article, our conclusions diverge
when it comes to deciding the type of discourse we want to extract from the text.
46 We both use the text for different purposes:  as her conception of what it  centrally
means  to  study  literature  implies,  Jaëck  sees  the  text  as  a  double  opportunity:  to
progress in knowledge within the scientific field of literary criticism—precisely here to
address  and  qualify  the  appropriation  of  the  motif  of  the  double  by  new-born
Modernism, through elaborate manipulation of focalisation—and to see how literature
constitutes  an  alternative  cognitive  tool,  how  it  serves  to  illuminate  a  better
understanding of the link between language and reality. As far as the second aspect is
concerned,  “The  End  of  the  Party”  illustrates  a  persistent  interest  in  her  current
research,  the  minor/major  dialectics,  the  way  a  major  mode  of  representation  is
challenged,  or  not,  by  the  advent  of  a  minor  dissident  mode.  Using  a  Foucauldian
approach, she sees literature as embedded in larger discursive stakes and fictional texts
as alternative actors in wider philosophical, social, political debates. As outlined in the
Deleuze and Guattari quote used at the beginning of Schmitt’s analysis, he believes one
of the most essential points ever made about literature is that the way fiction “thinks”
is fundamentally different from the way philosophy reflects on life. In fact, the other
key quote he confesses to having overused in his own research echoes Deleuze and
Guattari’s  remark:  “Literature is  something other  than reality.”  (Hamburger  9)  The
type of experience induced by literature is, for Schmitt, mostly about intimacy and most
of what comes out of this fundamentally private dialogue is not academic material. But
what  constitutes  fascinating  scientific  material  is  the  study  of  how  texts  work  on
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readers and of how we work on texts, and what it reveals about the multiple cognitive
processes of “dealing with literature.”
47 Finally,  Jaëck  proposes  to  raise  the  issue  of  the  “scientificity”  of  literary  criticism,
because she believes it is one of the central questions that such a critical endeavour as
this double paper raises: the aim is not so much to “check” every single point of each
other’s analysis,  as to be able to illustrate the reasons for the possibility of mutual
validation  beyond  partially  different  results—not  out  of  mutual  complacency,  but
simply because there exists a scientific method in literary criticism, and because we
feel it was respected by both participants. The preceding remark may sound defensive:
but all too often literary critics are faced with the disparaging argument—even among
their own ranks—that they may virtually say anything on a text, that their analyses are
“far-fetched,” over-straining the text,  imposing on it  personal obsessions or central
interests, or that they are simply “purely descriptive,” sterile tautologies. There are
some such analyses—but  then,  they  are  easily  marked and dismissed  as  such.  This
paper tries to address the idea that not any analysis of a text is valid, but that it needs
to  be  validated by  the  community  of  critics—a community  that,  just  like  any other
scientific  community,  is  duly  constituted  by  diplomas,  scientific  productions  and
academic positions. Here, as in any science, experts do come across different results,
and luckily so,  because this is  the way to progress in the way we circumscribe our
object, and how we devise evolving methods. The history of literary criticism amply
proves how mobile critical stances on texts are, but such differences are certainly not
proof  that  anything is  valid—on  the  contrary,  these  differences  stimulate  greater
scientific  awareness.  To  accept  each  other’s  alternative  results,  which  is  always  a
challenging task, we need to resort to an objective, informed, critical assessment of the
method: I did not “find” that, but am I convinced of its validity; in other words, was it
obtained  through  a  correct  use  of  the  tools?  Common  discourse  establishes  a
discrimination  between  “hard  sciences”  and  “soft  sciences,”  or  “Sciences”  and
“Humanities” in an Anglophone context—and many critics in literature are engaged in
giving their methods an increased level of scientificity, be it to protect the field from
ongoing assaults, or because they are themselves annoyed at what they often perceive
as self-indulging a-theoretical commentary on literary works. Jaëck tends to read in
Arnaud  Schmitt’s  cognitive  references  such  a  claim  for  “scientificity,”  precisely
modelled on theoretical models, on the desire to create more and more refined models
to deal with texts as opposed to analyses that otherwise run the risk of being either
descriptive and “thematic,” as Schmitt has it, or vastly subjective. As he himself says in
this paper: “Schmitt’s mirrors his growing interest in a ‘scientific’ approach to literary
theory.” It seems to Jaëck that such a claim leads him to integrate and take rank in the
adjacent field of narrative pragmatism and cognition, that is indeed more rigorously
fenced,  and  where  he  can  engage  in  a  debate  with  well-identified  authoritative
interlocutors  about  a  promising  new  development  in  literary  criticism—perhaps  a
scientific field within the broader literary field.
48 Jaëck,  however,  believes  that  literary  criticism  definitely  stands  as  a  valid  and
transmissible scientific field in itself. It is as unstable as every scientific field but shared
and agreed-upon at a given time by the scientific community. It is based, like any other
field of research, on a corpus of analyses that have been validated by the community of
scientific  researchers,  and  that  constitute  the  body  of  critical  reference  anyone
working on any author should endeavour to be extensively aware of, should be able to
refer to, and confront his/her own work against. As is the rule in any scientific field,
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criticism in literature relies on scientific methods, as it proceeds by researching the
existing literature on its object, advancing propositions, endeavouring to prove them,
and then submitting the results to those with authority in the field—as we are doing
with this joint reading, though “the scientific community” is here drastically reduced
to two people! As for Schmitt, he does not think that one approach is more scientific
than another nor is he particularly in pursuit of a higher degree of “scientificity;” he
even remains sceptical about the benefits of regarding literary theory as a scientific
field; he actually distinguishes between literary theory and literary analysis: he sees the
former as an offshoot of philosophy, a very specific branch mostly focusing on how
literature contributes to the more general study of essential phenomena such as, for
instance, reality, existence, knowledge whereas the latter is restricted to the study of
literary texts, thus displaying far less epistemic scope. As regards the issue of what falls
under “scientificity,” Schmitt agrees with Jaëck on the potential for validation inherent
in literary criticism, but he is highly dubious about the criteria used to “enforce this
scientificity.”  He even sees  this  urge  to  “validate”  as  intrinsically  opposed to  what
constitutes the very nature of the act of reading. This last point leads him to the reason
why he is currently more interested in using tools traditionally belonging to cognitive
sciences: first and foremost, it is not because he perceives them as more scientific, and
thus more reliable or simply “valid.” It is only because, being primarily destined for the
study  of  our  psychological  inner  workings  and  reflexes,  they  are  more  adapted  to
analysing  what  he  regards  now as  his  main  research  topic:  reading  (or  experiencing
literature)  as  opposed  to  literature.  He  is  keen  to  stress  that  resorting  to  a  more
scientific approach has never crossed his mind and remains irrelevant as to what he is
trying to achieve in his research. Nevertheless, he is surprised by the extreme prudence
of  the French humanities,  and its  persistent  unwillingness  to  simply try something
different  and take (very limited)  risks.  For  instance,  he  is  puzzled by the fact  that
literary criticism has neglected major cognitive phenomena, which directly influence
the semantic encounter between text and reader. He quite certainly is willing to use
different tools,  borrowed from different fields,  cognitive sciences being one,  but he
does not see one approach as prevailing over the others.
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NOTES
1. James wrote an essay on Robert  Louis  Stevenson,  and thus praised his  “Child’s  Garden of
Verses.” (Adam Smith 69).
2. “Une illusion oraculaire.” All French to English translations are mine.
3. “Le réel n’est admis que sous certaines conditions et seulement jusqu’à un certain point : s’il
abuse et se montre déplaisant, la tolérance est suspendue.”
4. “Le temps régresse vers l’amont et galope vers l’aval. Il mêle les temps, les parcourt en tous
sens, il délie le temps.”
5. “Un  usage  mineur  de  la  langue  majeure  [qui]  trace  dans  la  langue  une  sorte  de  langue
étrangère, qui n’est pas une autre langue, mais un devenir-autre de la langue, une minoration de
cette langue majeure.”
6. “Nul ne sait écrire. Chacun, le plus ‘grand’ surtout, écrit pour attraper par et dans le texte
quelque chose qu’il ne sait pas écrire. Qui ne se laissera pas écrire, il le sait. Baptisons cette chose
infantia, ce qui ne parle pas, ne se parle pas. Une enfance qui n’est pas un âge de la vie, qui hante
le discours adulte et qui lui échappe.” 
7. “L’enfant ‘tari’ […] qui fait d’autant mieux l’enfant qu’aucun flux d’enfance n’émane de lui.”
8. To Peter, Francis is indeed “abject” in the way Julia Kristeva defined the concept: he represents
the threat of a breakdown in meaning caused by the loss of the distinction between subject and
“object,” a word often used by Peter to refer to Francis. Francis is more a hallucinated double of
all he cannot assimilate in himself than an autonomous subject. He is what “is radically excluded
and […] draws me toward the place where meaning collapses” (Kristeva 2).
9. “Le soi refiguré par le récit est en réalité confronté à l’hypothèse de son propre néant.”
10. “L’art ne pense pas moins que la philosophie, mais il pense par affects et percepts” (Deleuze
and Guattari 64; my translation).
11. “La modélisation mimétique” (Schaeffer 122).
12. “Ce qui bloque l’écriture amoureuse, c’est l’illusion d’expressivité : écrivain, ou me pensant
tel,  je continue à me tromper sur les effets du langage: je ne sais pas que le mot ‘souffrance’
n’exprime aucune souffrance et que, par conséquent, l’employer, non seulement ce n’est rien
communiquer, mais encore, très vite, c’est agacer (sans parler du ridicule)” (Barthes, Fragments 
114).
13. “Le message est lié paramétriquement à sa performance” (Barthes, S/Z 698).
14. See Alber et al (2010).
15. “La dissimulation provisoire d’une information cruciale” (my translation).
16. “Un effacement seulement partiel dans le discours d’un événement crucial” (my translation).
17. “Un événement initial  ayant la  potentialité  de conduire à un résultat  important (bon ou
mauvais)” (my translation).
18. Furthermore, on the aspect of interpretation, Schmitt totally agrees with Richard Rorty’s
reply to Eco and, more generally, with the Pragmatist ethos: “He [Eco] insists upon a distinction
between interpreting texts and using texts. This, of course, is a distinction we pragmatists do not
wish to make. In our view, all anybody ever does with anything is use it. Interpreting something,
knowing it, penetrating to its essence, and so on are all just various ways of describing some
process of putting it to work” (Rorty 93). 
19. It is, but Schmitt does not mean to discard thematic criticism, although according to him it
has given rise to a form of criticism that, more often than not, is too remote from the experience
of the text. As we all know, and this is exactly what Eco dreads, anything can be said about any
text. But Schmitt acknowledges the fact that thematic criticism, when it is well done, can also be
a very enlightening way to connect our experience of a text to our experiences in the world.
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ABSTRACTS
In this article, two French scholars look back on their practices as critics via a double, reflexive
analysis of Graham Greene’s short story, “The End of the Party.” While they belong to the same
generation,  they  were  influenced  by  different  theoretical  backgrounds:  French  classical
narratology and French theory on the one hand, post-classical narratology and cognitive poetics
on the other. This approach was a means for them to assess the nature and relevance of their
critical tools, figure out how these tools impact the reading of a selected text and what they
reveal about their respective academic practices of literature. From a practical point of view,
they worked on the same short story, each writing an independent analysis, and then produced a
joint commentary in order to see what the process revealed about their respective approaches to
literary theory. The purpose of this strategy was to better understand their critical methods but
also the stakes inherent in literary interpretation at the beginning of the twenty first century.
Eventually, they hope that this dual analysis will contribute to renew their respective methods.
Dans  cet  article,  deux  universitaires  français  reviennent  sur  leurs  pratiques  en  tant  que
chercheurs en littérature par le biais d’une double analyse de la nouvelle de Graham Greene
« The End of the Party ». Bien qu’appartenant à la même génération, ils ont été influencés par des
champs théoriques différents : la narratologie classique et ce qu’on appelle la French theory pour
l’une,  la  narratologie  postclassique  et  la  poétique  cognitive  pour  l’autre.  Cette  analyse  fut
l’occasion pour eux de faire un bilan de leurs outils critiques, d’interroger la nature et la validité
de ces outils et ainsi de comprendre dans quelle mesure ceux-ci influencent leur lecture d’un
même texte, et ce qu’ils révèlent de leurs méthodes herméneutiques en général. D’un point de
vue pratique, ils ont travaillé sur la même nouvelle, en ont proposé chacun une étude, et produit
en dernier lieu un commentaire commun, en tentant de mettre en évidence ce que cette façon de
travailler révèle de leurs approches respectives de la théorie littéraire. Cette stratégie visait à
mieux comprendre leurs méthodes critiques mais aussi les enjeux inhérents à l’interprétation
littéraire  au  début  du  vingt-et-unième  siècle.  In  fine,  ils  espèrent  que  cette  double  lecture
contribuera à renouveler la méthode de chacun.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Greene Graham, enfance, littérature, narratologie, parodie, gémellité, dualité
Keywords: Greene Graham, childhood, literature, narratology, parody, twins, duality
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